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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
 
 Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 29(c)(1), 
undersigned counsel for amici make the following disclosures. The Fred T. 
Korematsu Center for Law and Equality is a research and advocacy organization 
based at Seattle University, a non-profit educational institution under Section 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The Korematsu Center does not have any 
parent corporation or issue stock and consequently there exists no publicly held 
corporation which owns 10 percent or more of its stock. 
The Asian Bar Association of Washington, the Latina/o Bar Association of 
Washington, the Loren Miller Bar Association, the South Asian Bar Association of 
Washington, and the Vietnamese American Bar Association of Washington are 
non-profit organizations that do not have any parent corporations or issue stock 
and consequently there exist no publicly held corporations which own 10 percent 
or more of their stock. 
STATEMENT REGARDING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE 
Consent to file this amicus brief was sought from all parties, but some 
parties did not consent. This proposed amicus brief is therefore accompanied by a 
motion for leave to file pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a). 
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STATEMENT OF IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
1
 
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality (Korematsu Center) is 
a non-profit organization based at Seattle University School of Law that works to 
advance justice through research, advocacy, and education. Inspired by the legacy 
of Fred Korematsu, who defied the military orders during World War II that 
ultimately led to the incarceration of 110,000 Japanese Americans, the Korematsu 
Center works to advance social justice for all. It has a special interest in promoting 
fairness in the courts of our country. That interest includes ensuring that effective 
remedies exist to address bias in the courtroom. The Korematsu Center does not, in 
this brief or otherwise, represent the official views of Seattle University. 
The Asian Bar Association of Washington (ABAW) is the professional 
association of Asian Pacific American attorneys, judges, law professors, and law 
students that strives to be a network for its members in Washington State. Created 
in 1987, ABAW advocates for the legal needs and interests for the APA 
community and represents over 200 APA attorneys in a wide-range of practice 
areas. It is a local affiliate of the National Asian Pacific American Bar Association. 
Through its network of committees, ABAW monitors legislative developments and 
                                           
1
 Amici certify that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(c)(5), no 
party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part, nor did any party or party’s 
counsel contribute money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting this 
brief. No person—other than the amici curiae, its members, or its counsel—
contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting this brief. 
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judicial appointments, rates judicial candidates and advocates for equal 
opportunity, and builds coalitions with other organizations within the legal 
profession and in the community at large. ABAW also addresses crises faced by its 
members and the broader Asian and Pacific Islander community in Washington.  
The Latina/o Bar Association of Washington (LBAW) represents the 
concerns and goals of Latino attorneys and Latino people of the State of 
Washington. LBAW’s 250 members include judges, solo practitioners, 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, public sector attorneys, private sector attorneys, in-
house legal counsel, and law students. It encourages and promotes the active 
participation of all Latino attorneys throughout Washington State and seeks the 
involvement of Latino political, governmental, educational, and business leaders. 
LBAW aims to provide solutions to complex issues that confront the legal system 
and the Latino community. 
The Loren Miller Bar Association (LMBA) is an affiliate chapter of the 
National Bar Association. LMBA is a nonprofit organization dedicated to 
defending the civil rights and constitutional freedoms consistent with the principles 
of a free democratic society. LMBA’s 500 current and past members are primarily 
African-American judges, attorneys, law professors, and law students. LMBA is 
committed to addressing legal issues and social and economic disparities affecting 
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the African-American community, and increasing access to justice within 
Washington State. 
The South Asian Bar Association of Washington (SABAW) is a professional 
association of attorneys, law professors, judges, and law students involved in 
issues impacting the South Asian community in Washington State. Created in 
2001, SABAW provides pro bono legal services to the community, engages in 
outreach and education efforts, monitors the rights of its membership, and provides 
financial assistance to law students and practicing attorneys. SABAW also builds 
coalitions with other professional organizations sharing the goals of equal 
opportunity and access to justice. SABAW is strongly interested in issues 
surrounding the perception and economic, social, and political rights of its 
membership in the legal system. 
The Vietnamese American Bar Association of Washington (VABAW) is a 
legal society that was formed in 2005 for Vietnamese American attorneys, law 
students, and friends who share its common vision. VABAW strives for legal 
excellence by facilitating and cultivating both professional and personal 
relationships among its members, the community, and the judiciary. VABAW’s 
goal is to provide mutual support for attorneys in the advancement of their careers, 
to be a trusted guide and resource for students who aspire towards the legal 
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profession, to serve as a voice for the local Vietnamese American community, and 
to represent Vietnamese American attorneys within the state bar. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The fair and impartial administration of justice requires counsel to refrain 
from making improper racial remarks. Unfortunately, courts have seen numerous 
instances of explicit appeals to prejudice made by counsel, and courts have 
responded immediately to such improper remarks by providing curative 
instructions, and, when appropriate, granting a new trial. Increasingly, social 
scientists, judges, legal scholars, and practitioners are becoming more aware of 
how implicit bias operates in the courtroom. Implicit bias comes in many forms, 
and no one is immune from it—neither judges, juries, nor advocates.  
In-group favoritism, a form of implicit bias that can be defined as the 
association of positive stereotypes and attitudes with members of a favored group, 
leads to preferential treatment for those in the “in-group.” In this case, defense 
counsel’s improper remark about the white racial identity of Evans Fruit’s owners 
invited the all-white jury to look more favorably upon Evans Fruit and its owners 
than on the Latina Plaintiffs. Because the court overruled Plaintiffs’ objection and 
failed to provide a curative instruction, a new trial is warranted. 
Case: 13-35885     04/07/2014          ID: 9047485     DktEntry: 32-2     Page: 10 of 37
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BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought suit 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991 to vindicate the rights of a group of female employees of Evans Fruit 
Company, Inc., who contended that they were subjected to a hostile work 
environment because of sex. ER 497-98. Intervenors-Plaintiffs Elodia Sanchez, 
Daniela Barajas, and Cecilia Lua brought both federal and state law claims that 
Evans Fruit was liable for sexual harassment and for acting negligently in the 
company’s supervision and retention of the ranch foreman who allegedly subjected 
the women to the sexually hostile work environment. ER 483. 
During closing, defense counsel introduced the race of Mr. and Mrs. Evans, 
the owners of Evans Fruit, stating: 
Now, the EEOC and . . . [counsel for Intervenors-Plaintiffs] also have 
argued to you at the beginning and today that the Evans didn't care 
about their employees, they’re just a bunch of rich white people who 
are focused on money.  
 
ER 117 (emphasis added). As merits counsel points out, neither counsel from 
EEOC nor Northwest Justice Project made any mention of the Evanses’ race. 
Intervenors-Plaintiffs-Appellants Opening Brief at 16.
2
 Rather, Plaintiffs argued 
that Evans Fruit did not take any corrective action against Juan Marin, the ranch 
                                           
2
 We refer to this infra as “Intervenors-Plaintiffs Op. Br.” to distinguish it from 
Plaintiff-Appellant EEOC’s Opening Brief. 
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foreman, until Mr. Evans discovered Marin’s financial malfeasance. Intervenors-
Plaintiffs Op. Br. at 22. Later in closing, defense counsel continued: 
And you may consider that that is a powerful incentive to invent or 
exaggerate their stories. At some level I understand that. These folks 
are poor. For the most part, they’re uneducated, and their career paths, 
frankly, are not bright. This is their chance to get some extra money, 
and they’re grabbing the brass ring. However sympathetic their 
financial conditions may be, it is simply not fair and it’s not right that 
they try to get money from Mr. and Mrs. Evans that they do not 
legally deserve.  
 
ER 118-19 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs objected to the “rich white people” remark, 
but the court overruled the objection. ER 117. 
The irrelevant and inflammatory racial comments offended fundamental 
fairness and deprived the Plaintiffs of the Constitution’s guarantee of due process. 
U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Bird v. Glacier Elec. Coop., Inc., 255 F.3d 1136, 1148-
50 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiffs’ counsel’s references to the Indian 
corporate manager of the plaintiff corporation, the “killing” of Indian business, and 
Custer’s massacre had no relevance to the case and were used as an attempt to 
incite the jury’s prejudice by linking the behavior of the defendant corporation to 
white racism). The use of the word “white,” combined with the “speaker, audience, 
[decision-making] process, and purpose” created a situation that likely set a racial 
context instead of promoting a race-neutral environment. Barbara Flagg, Was 
Blind, but Now I See: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of 
Discriminatory Intent, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 953, 977 (1993). 
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Amici encourage this Court to consider how defense counsel’s emphasis on 
the race of the individuals involved activated the implicit, as well as explicit, biases 
of the jury, encouraging it to view the case through a racial frame. First, Amici 
discuss the legal landscape of attorney misconduct, demonstrating that courts 
recognize the prejudice inherent in improper reference to race in the civil, as well 
as criminal, context. Second, Amici provide social science and legal background 
explaining implicit bias in the courtroom, in contrast to the more recognizable 
forms of explicit bias. Third, Amici explain in-group favoritism as a manifestation 
of implicit bias. Fourth, Amici explore the concept of “priming”—a specific 
mechanism of implicit bias and in-group favoritism. Fifth, Amici summarize social 
science studies demonstrating how in-group favoritism leads to disparate 
outcomes. Amici argue that defense counsel’s emphasis on Mr. and Mrs. Evanses’ 
race could have biased the all-white jurors towards Evans Fruit, calling into 
question the integrity of the jury’s deliberative process, and therefore the defense 
verdict.  
ARGUMENT 
I. IMPROPER REFERENCES TO RACE ARE RECOGNIZED FORMS 
OF ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT AND PROVIDE GROUNDS FOR A 
NEW TRIAL.  
A. Improper References to Race that May Prejudice the Jury 
Against a Litigant Are Grounds for a New Trial. 
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Racially inflammatory comments made during opening statements and 
closing arguments are “beyond the limits of legitimate advocacy” when not 
relevant to the “facts and legal theories applicable” to the case and should not be 
used to “raise prejudice and inflame the jury.” Bird, 255 F.3d at 1150-51. The 
invocation of race distracts the jury from considering relevant evidence and instead 
“draws the jury’s attention to a characteristic that the Constitution generally 
demands they ignore.” United States v. Hernandez, 865 F.2d 925, 928 (7th Cir. 
1989). Thus, emotionally charged statements that encourage the jury to consider 
racial biases are never appropriate when race is not relevant to the case. Bird, 255 
F.3d at 1151; Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that 
inflammatory prosecutorial arguments made about the violent nature of people of 
the Sikh faith might have motivated jury to focus upon prejudicial inferences); 
Fontanello v. United States, 19 F.2d 921, 921-22 (9th Cir. 1927) (holding that 
district attorney’s statement regarding Italian immigrants as criminals was 
unwarranted because it created racial prejudice). 
In both civil and criminal cases, this Court has held that inflammatory 
comments made by counsel during opening statements and closing argument are 
improper and could be sufficiently prejudicial as to warrant a new trial. Bird, 255 
F.3d at 1136; Cudjo v. Ayers, 698 F.3d 752, 770 (9th Cir. 2012) (vacating 
conviction because prosecutor’s inflammatory racial comment made in closing 
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argument prejudicially affected defendant’s testimony); Kelly v. Stone, 514 F.2d 
18, 19 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that prosecutor’s inflammatory statement that 
“maybe the next time it won’t be a little black girl from the other side of the 
tracks” was sufficiently prejudicial to deny the defendant a fair trial). “Fairness to 
parties and the need for a fair trial are important not only in criminal but also in 
civil proceedings, both of which require due process.” Bird, 255 F.3d at 1151.  
Courts in Washington State have similarly held since at least 1922 that 
appeals to racial prejudice toward a litigant in a civil case requires remedial action. 
Schotis v. N. Coast Stevedoring Co., 1 P.2d 221, 225, 228 (Wash. 1931) (counsel’s 
statements that the “Japanese people don’t like us” in civil case involving a 
defendant Japanese corporation required reversal and remand for new trial); see 
also Int’l Lumber Export Co. v. M. Furuya Co., 209 P. 858, 860 (Wash. 1922) 
(counsel’s argument in civil trial to jury concerning credibility and integrity of 
Japanese probably cured by prompt instruction of court).  
B. Improper References to Race that Highlight Commonalities 
Between a Party and the Jury May Create Bias in Favor of a 
Litigant and Are Also Grounds for a New Trial. 
While courts have consistently recognized that fostering racial animosity by 
the jury against a party is improper, courts have also held that counsel may not 
make comments that encourage jurors to act out of bias in favor of a litigant. Both 
this Court and others have granted relief based on counsel’s appeals to racial and 
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ethnic solidarity between a party and the jury. Bird, 255 F.3d at 1125; Texas 
Emp’rs’ Ins. Ass’n v. Guerrero, 800 S.W.2d 859, 866 (Tex. App. 1990).  
In Bird, a few tribal members, individually and on behalf of their 
corporation, sued another corporation owned by non-tribal members in front of an 
all-Native American jury in tribal court. 255 F.3d at 1136. Plaintiffs alleged that as 
soon as they purchased the corporation, the defendant corporation began giving its 
business to non-Native American owned companies. Id. at 1139. In closing 
argument, plaintiff’s counsel made inflammatory comments emphasizing the 
legacy of colonialism and racism against Native Americans by White Americans, 
including the Custer massacre. Id. at 1149. This Court stated the “argumentative 
appeals to historical racial prejudices of or against the white race” appealed to 
“Indian collective memory” and had “no proper purpose” in the trial. Id. at 1151. 
This Court reversed the district’s court recognition of the tribal court judgment, 
reasoning the closing argument “offended due process by its appeal to racial 
enmity and bias.”3 Id. at 1152.  
In Guerrero, plaintiff’s counsel made subtle remarks soliciting “unity” 
between the Hispanic community and the plaintiff, and the court found these 
                                           
3
 Because the case was tried in tribal court, this Court reversed the district court’s 
enforcement of the tribal court judgment and instructed the trial court to enter 
judgment for defendant. Importantly, this Court noted: “Had this case been tried in 
federal court, our ruling might permit consideration of the possibility of a remand 
for a new trial.” Id. at 1153.  
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comments were improper. The plaintiff, who had fallen from a tractor and hurt his 
back, sued for worker’s compensation benefits. Guerrero, 800 S.W.2d at 860-61. 
Plaintiff, plaintiff’s counsel, and most members of the jury, based on their 
surnames, were Hispanic. Id. at 862. During closing argument, plaintiff’s counsel 
intimated to the jury that now was the time for “unity” and “to stick together as a 
community.” Id.  
The court stated this “veiled and subtle” reference to ethnicity was just as 
improper as an explicit reference to race. Id. at 864-65. To the court, these 
references, which were aimed at encouraging “ethnic solidarity” between the 
plaintiff and jury members, were “an affront to the court” and “offense…against 
society.” Id. at 862, 865. Although the court noted its holding was not applicable to 
“incidental” or unintentional references to race, the court nevertheless recognized 
the impact of subtle and “slick” appeals to solidarity. Id. at 865, 867. The court 
explained: 
To permit the sophisticated ethnic plea while condemning those that are 
open and unabashed would simply reward counsel for ingenuity in 
packaging. Inevitably, lawyers representing their clients zealously within the 
bounds of the law would test the limits and fine-tune their arguments to 
avoid being too explicit. Courts would be asked to label some arguments 
permissible and uphold them with a wink when everyone knew that an 
ethnic appeal had been made. That course would demean the law and 
perhaps deepen the divisions from which society already suffers…If we 
were to affirm the judgment before us, we would establish a precedent 
permitting calculated, subtle racial or ethnic arguments by all litigants in 
all types of cases – personal injury, family law, commercial – provided the 
arguments were properly dressed up and disguised….All litigants…should 
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feel free to litigate their cases before juries in all 254 counties without facing 
state-of-the-art ethnic pleas in closing argument. Such arguments are 
forbidden, and it matters not whether counsel suggests—depending upon 
the venue—that the jury reward or penalize a litigant for belonging or not 
belonging to a racial or ethnic group.  
 
Id. at 865 (emphasis added). The court reversed and remanded the case because the 
appeal to ethnic solidarity was an incurable reversible error. Id. at 866.  
Courts’ recognition of the danger inherent in arguments that call upon biases 
both against and in favor of litigants reflects the existence of both explicit and 
implicit bias.  
II. IMPLICIT BIAS, NO LESS THAN EXPLICIT BIAS, IF LEFT 
UNCHECKED IN THE COURTROOM, COMPROMISES THE FAIR 
AND IMPARTIAL ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. 
Discrimination and bias may of course manifest in explicit ways. For 
example, a person who uses a racial slur or vandalizes a person of color’s property 
acts out of explicit bias, or what some scholars refer to as “aversive” racism. 
Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, Understanding and Addressing 
Contemporary Racism: From Aversive Racism to the Common Ingroup Identity 
Model, 61 J. Soc. Issues 615, 618 (2005). However, as United States District Court 
Judge Mark Bennett explains, “Society in general and courts in particular have 
been aware of explicit bias for years….A battery of state and federal laws are 
aimed at eradicating intentional discrimination, that is, discrimination based on 
explicit bias.” Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in 
Case: 13-35885     04/07/2014          ID: 9047485     DktEntry: 32-2     Page: 18 of 37
13 
 
Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise 
of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 149, 151-52 (2010).  
A. Implicit Bias 
It is widely accepted that conscious racism is unacceptable, but unconscious 
discrimination too cuts at the very core of fundamental fairness and justice in the 
courtroom. Flagg, supra, at 989. Social psychologists have documented that bias 
also operates on a subconscious level. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton 
Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 945, 951 (2006). 
This is known as implicit bias, which is the “plethora of fears, feelings, 
perceptions, and stereotypes that lie deep within our subconscious, without our 
conscious permission or acknowledgement.” Bennett, supra, at 149. People may 
still have implicit biases even if they do not believe in those ideas. Greenwald & 
Krieger, supra, at 951; Bennett, supra, at 149-50.  
One of the most common ways to measure implicit bias is through the 
Implicit Assessment Test (IAT). Created by social psychologists in 1998, the IAT 
measures “differential association” of “attitude objects” (such as racial groups) 
with an “evaluative dimension”; the speed of the reaction to the pairing of the 
attitude object and the evaluative dimension reflects the attitudes and stereotypes 
of that person, i.e., that person’s implicit biases. See generally Anthony G. 
Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The 
Case: 13-35885     04/07/2014          ID: 9047485     DktEntry: 32-2     Page: 19 of 37
14 
 
Implicit Association Test, 74 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 1464 (1998); see also 
Bennett, supra, at 153.
4
  
For example, in one implicit bias study, white college students were 
presented with 50 male names and 50 female names and were asked to categorize 
them as pleasant or unpleasant. Greenwald et al., supra, at 1474. Half of the male 
names and half of the female names “were more likely to belong to White 
Americans than to Black Americans.” Id. at 1473. The students implicitly preferred 
White Americans, as judged by the quicker reaction times when choosing a White 
name as “pleasant.” Id. at 1474. The IAT results were then compared with 
questionnaires filled out by the participants. On the explicit questionnaires, many 
of the participants “endorsed a position of either Black-White indifference…or 
Black preference.” Id. at 1475. However, their IAT results stated differently, 
showing an implicit White preference. Id. Thus, people are often not aware of their 
implicit biases, because those biases contradict their otherwise egalitarian 
principles.
5
  
                                           
4
 The IAT was created by Anthony G. Greenwald, Debbie E. McGhee, and Jordan 
L. K. Schwartz. See generally Greenwald et al., supra. Greenwald, along with 
Mahzarin Banaji and Brian Nosek, went on to create a nonprofit called Project 
Implicit. Project Implicit’s website is hosted by Harvard University and has an 
online IAT available for anyone to take. It is available at 
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/takeatest.html. 
5
 See generally Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the 
Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 17 (2009). 
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Implicit biases are particularly dangerous in the courtroom. Judge Bennett 
explains that “[j]urors, lawyers, and judges do not leave behind their implicit 
biases when they walk through the courthouse doors.” Bennett, supra, at 150. 
Judge Bennett encourages that “[l]awyers, judges, and other legal professionals 
need to heighten their awareness and understanding of implicit bias, its role in our 
civil and criminal justice system, and in particular, the problems that it creates with 
regard to juries.” Id. at 152. 
One such implicit bias at play in this case is what social scientists and 
scholars refer to as “in-group favoritism.” 
B. In-Group Favoritism Is a Manifestation of Implicit Bias. 
The theory of in-group favoritism explains “people would favor their own 
group at the expense of other groups in terms of their evaluations, judgments, and 
behavior in intergroup relations.” Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup 
Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 Soc. 
Just. Res. 143, 146 (2004). In-group favoritism is distinct from aversive racism, 
whose focal points are the negative beliefs about and associations with another 
group. Gaertner & Dovidio, supra, at 618. Discriminatory conduct is only partially 
motivated by animus against out groups; people also discriminate to “elevate the 
status of their own group and themselves.” Catherine Smith, The Group Dangers 
of Race-Based Conspiracies, 59 Rutgers L. Rev. 55, 58, 68-72 (2006) [hereinafter 
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Smith, Group Dangers]. “Racial discrimination is as much an exercise of in-group 
favoritism as it is an exercise of out-group derision.” Id. at 58. Studies have 
demonstrated that, as a result of this implicit favoritism toward one’s own “group,” 
people are more likely to empathize with their in-group than those in the out-
group. Mina Cikara et al., Us & Them: Intergroup Failures of Empathy, 20 Current 
Directions in Psychol. Sci. 149, 150 (2011). 
Additionally, many studies have shown that thinking more positively of an 
in-group is an automatic response. Dasgupta, supra, at 146 (listing studies on the 
automaticity of in-group favoritism). An individual who identifies with a group 
makes decisions and judgments to favor that in-group. Id. This theory links to the 
larger social identity theory, which states that people engage in in-group favoritism 
“when [they] strongly identify with their in group and when their self-esteem is 
linked to the perceived worthiness of their in group.” Id.; see also Catherine Smith, 
Unconscious Bias and “Outsider” Interest Convergence, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1077, 
1084-85 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, Unconscious Bias] (“This entire process [the 
categorization into in-groups and out-groups] stems from a quest to bolster the 
individual’s own self image.” (citations omitted)). People are biased towards an in-
group because identifying with the in-group is a social norm. Social identification 
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along race, sex, and sexual orientation is “highly prevalent.”6 Smith, Unconscious 
Bias, supra, at 1085.  
The existence of in-group favoritism has concrete and identifiable 
consequences. Depending on the degree of loyalty to one’s own race, the 
bolstering of self translates into gains for the in-group, ranging from “positive 
thoughts, feeling and emotions directed toward the racial in-group member, to the 
allocation of resources and benefits.” Smith, Group Dangers, supra, at 83 
(citations omitted). 
C. Priming Is a Mechanism that Invokes Implicit Bias and In-Group 
Favoritism. 
A picture, word, or phrase can activate implicit bias, including in-group 
favoritism. This is referred to as “priming” in social science literature. “Priming 
refers to the incidental activation of knowledge structures, such as trait concepts 
and stereotypes, by the current situational context.” John A. Bargh et al., 
Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and Stereotype 
Activation on Action, 71 J. of Personality & Soc. Psychol. 230, 230 (1996). 
Social scientists distinguish between personal beliefs and stereotypes 
activated by priming, because each is a “conceptually distinct cognitive 
                                           
6
 This form of social identification begins at an early age. Anna-Kaisa Newheiser 
& Kristina R. Olson, White and Black American Children’s Implicit Intergroup 
Bias, 48 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 264 (2012) (detailing other studies about 
how children implicitly favor racial in-groups). 
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structure[].” Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and 
Controlled Components, 56 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 5, 5 (1989).  
Automatic processes involve the unintentional or spontaneous activation of 
some well-learned set of associations or responses that have been developed 
through repeated activation in memory. They do not require conscious effort 
and appear to be initiated by the presence of stimulus cues in the 
environment. A crucial component of automatic processes is their 
inescapability; they occur despite deliberate attempts to bypass or ignore 
them. In contrast, controlled processes are intentional and require the active 
attention of the individual. Controlled processes, although limited by 
capacity, are more flexible than automatic processes. Their intentionality and 
flexibility makes them particularly useful for decision making, problem 
solving, and the initiation of new behaviors. 
 
Id. at 6 (citations omitted).  
A “prime” is a mechanism that taps into these well-learned sets of 
associations. When “primed” with a word or concept, a person’s brain 
automatically activates certain responses, associations, and biases. Devine, supra, 
at 5-6; Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual 
Processing, 87 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 876, 877 (2004); Endel Tulving & 
Daniel L. Schacter, Priming and Human Memory Systems, 247 Sci. 301 (1990). 
People are often unaware of priming because it is an unconscious process that 
operates “independent of explicit memory.” Tulving & Schacter, supra, at 302 
(listing studies showing that priming does not deal with explicit memory).  
The responses to priming draw upon “a lifetime of socialization 
experiences,” with studies showing that people begin internalizing racial 
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preferences at a young age. Devine, supra, at 6 (listing studies testing how and if 
children identify stereotypes); see also Newheiser & Olson, supra, at 264; John A. 
Bargh et al., Automaticity in Social-Cognitive Processes, 16 Trends in Cognitive 
Sci. 593, 599 (2012) (detailing studies about how children have been shown to 
implicitly favor racial in-groups). As a result of that early socialization, racial 
stereotypes are easily primed. See B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The 
Role of Automatic and Controlled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 181, 190 (2001); Eberhardt et al., supra, at 889; 
Devine, supra, at 7-15. See generally Tali Mendelberg, Racial Priming Revived, 6 
Persps. of Pol. 109 (2008) (listing studies on priming, both generally and in the 
political context). In many studies, participants who have been primed are often 
more positive towards their in-group and more negative towards the out-group. 
Eberhardt et al., supra, at 880; Payne, supra, at 190. 
One study primed white Americans with the words “black” or “white” to see 
whether, as a result of the priming, participants’ implicit biases would activate. 
Bernd Wittenbrink et al., Evidence for Racial Prejudice at the Implicit Level & Its 
Relationship with Questionnaire Measures, 72 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 262 
(1997).
7
 Participants sat in front of a computer, where an ethnic prime (“black,” or 
                                           
7
 Eighty-eight participants were recruited from the introductory psychology 
participant pool at the University of Colorado. African American students were 
excluded from the sample. Id. at 265-66. The goal in the study was “to develop a 
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“white”), a foil prime (e.g., “table”), or a neutral nonword prime (e.g., “XXXXX”) 
was flashed on the screen for about 15 milliseconds. Id. at 266. Two seconds 
following the prime, a defined set of target words, some “positively valenced”8 and 
some “negatively valenced,” were placed on the screen; participants then had to 
indicate whether the target word formed a “correct” word by selecting “yes” or 
“no.” Id. at 267. The researchers found that participants more quickly indicated the 
target words which were positive stereotypes of white Americans were correct 
words when preceded by the “white” prime, and that participants more quickly 
indicated the target words which were negative stereotypes of black Americans 
were correct words when preceded by the “black” prime. Id. at 268, 271 (“[I]tem 
identification was significantly facilitated when positively valenced White 
American items followed the WHITE prime and when negatively valenced African 
American items followed the BLACK prime.”).  
This and other studies establish that priming facilitates existing prejudices. 
When the word “white” is introduced, not only is a racial context set, but racial 
characteristics are established as between whites and others who are nonwhite. 
Thus, the pursuit of colorblindness is inadequate in addressing and establishing 
                                                                                                                                        
completely unobtrusive measure of White American participants’ associations with 
the social categories of African Americans and White Americans.” Id. at 271. 
8
 I.e., some of the target words were stereotypical when applied to white or black 
Americans. Id. “Valenced” refers to either the intrinsic attractiveness (positive 
valence) or aversiveness (negative valence) of an event, object or circumstance. 
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substantive racial justice because the baseline for race-neutrality is whiteness. 
Flagg, supra, at 954. These white norms are a unique form of unconscious 
discrimination that systematically makes whiteness transparent, starkly contrasted 
by nonwhites. Id. at 959, 970.  
Recognizing the reality of implicit bias, law professors have collaborated 
with social scientists to examine the operation of implicit biases that jurors bring to 
the courtroom. Although based on mock jurors and hypothetical cases, these 
studies give important insight into the relationship between implicit bias and 
disparate outcomes. 
D. Implicit Biases Affect Juror Decision Making.  
One study tested the impact that race would have on in-group favoritism 
among jurors in a mock criminal trial. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, 
Race in the Courtroom: Perceptions of Guilt and Dispositional Attributions, 26 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 1367, 1368 (2000). Groups comprised of either 
all-white or all-black mock jurors were given twelve trial summaries to consider, 
of which five were cross-racial crimes (the remaining summaries did not mention 
race at all). Id. at 1369. Of the five involving a cross-racial crime, half of the 
participants read about a white defendant and the other half read about a black 
defendant. Id. After deliberating, the participants were asked to rate the guilt of the 
defendant and the relative strength of each defendant’s case. Id.  
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In considering the cross-racial crimes, the white jurors did not express in-
group favoritism and objectively sentenced both black and white defendants. Id. at 
1369-71. The researchers concluded the white mock jurors were objective because 
the “salient” racial issues in those five cross-racial crimes alerted the white jurors 
“to the possibility of prejudice and [made] racial norms salient.” Id. at 1371. When 
racial issues are “obvious in a trial, a motivation to appear nonprejudiced is 
activated in White jurors”; the racially charged nature of the cases motivated the 
white jurors to consciously combat racial prejudice. Id. Sommers and Ellsworth 
then predicted that in a case that had “no blatantly racial issues, we expected White 
mock jurors to be more punitive toward a Black defendant than toward a White 
defendant.” Id. at 1372. 
To confirm their hypothesis, Sommers and Ellsworth designed the second 
part of the study around an assault and battery case, in which the race of the parties 
was conveyed in a short case summary. Id. Both white and black mock jurors 
considered the case; in some of the case summaries, the defendant was white and 
the victim was black, and in the other case summaries, the defendant was black and 
the victim was white. Id. The case summary presented either a “race-salient” and 
“non-race-salient” version of the case. The race-salient version of the case 
involved the victim’s testimony about what the defendant had said to her: “You 
know better than to talk that way about a White (or Black) man in front of his 
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friends.” Id. at 1372-73. The non-race-salient version involved the same victim 
testimony but without the mention of defendant’s race. Id. at 1373.  
In the race-salient case, white jurors did not differ in their guilt ratings of 
white and black defendants. Id. On the other hand, in the non-race-salient version 
of the case, “both White and Black mock jurors demonstrated in group/out group 
bias.”9 Id. at 1374-75. White jurors gave black defendants “significantly higher 
guilt rating[s]” and recommended longer sentences for the black defendant than the 
white defendant, demonstrating in-group favoritism.
10
 Id. at 1375. Thus, in cases 
where race is “not a salient trial issue,” white jurors may be “influenced by racial 
bias” and treat their racial in-group more favorably. Id. at 1376. This research 
raises the possibility of disparate outcomes in real trials. 
As this study shows, the mere reference of race in a case where race is 
irrelevant can significantly impact the ability of jurors to engage in impartial 
decision making.  
Tara Mitchell and her colleagues conducted a meta-analysis of studies 
analyzing the impact that racial bias has on juror decision-making. Tara L. 
Mitchell et al., Racial Bias in Mock Juror Decision-Making: A Meta-Analytic 
                                           
9
 All of the black mock jurors exhibited in-group bias across the studies; the 
researchers believed this was due to the awareness of racial disparities for black 
communities in the criminal justice system. Id. at 1376. 
10
 All of the black mock jurors demonstrated the same in-group favoritism for the 
black defendant. Id.  
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Review of Defendant Treatment, 29 Law & Hum. Behav. 621, 627-28 (2005). 
Mitchell’s meta-analysis examined thirty-four juror verdict studies with a total of 
7,397 participants, and sixteen juror sentencing studies with a total of 3,141 
participants. Id. at 625. All of these studies involved experimental manipulation of 
the defendant’s race; each tested whether a juror’s differential treatment of a 
defendant who belonged to a racial out-group was impacted by racial bias. Racial 
bias was defined as “a juror’s disparate treatment of a defendant from a racial out-
group, when compared with a defendant of the juror’s own-race, in verdict and 
sentencing decisions.” Id. at 624-25. Each study examined had to meet the 
following criteria:  
(1) the study had to involve an experimental manipulation of the race of the 
defendant; (2) the study had to contain enough information to define racial 
bias as the disparate treatment of a defendant from a racial out-group, such 
that results from multi-race participant samples were presented separately 
for each race; and (3) the study had to assess guilt or sentencing in the 
context of a mock juror simulation. 
 
Id. at 625.  
The researchers hypothesized “that mock jurors would exhibit an in-group 
bias in decision-making, such that individuals would be more lenient on defendants 
of their own racial group than defendants of another racial group.” Id. at 672. The 
results of the examination indicated “a small, but significant, effect for racial bias 
in both verdict and sentencing decisions.” Id. at 629. Jurors of one race tended to 
show bias against defendants who belonged to another race, or out-groups. Id. at 
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627. Other researchers have found similar results. See, e.g., Jerry Kang et al., 
Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1124, 1142-43 (2012) (finding 
that white jurors will treat black defendants worse than they treat comparable white 
defendants).  
In contemplating the import of these studies on the justice system, it is 
crucial to recognize that “effects deemed ‘small’ by social scientists may 
nonetheless have huge consequences for the individual, the social category he 
belongs to, and the entire society.” Id. at 1143.  
E. Courts Can Effectively Address Jurors About the Dangers of 
Implicit Bias. 
Because implicit biases exist, judges should educate jurors about these 
biases and encourage strategies to combat their dangers. For example, Judge 
Bennett discusses implicit bias during jury selection. Kang, supra, at 1182. See 
generally Bennett, supra. Judge Bennett spends nearly thirty minutes explaining 
implicit bias to the jury during jury selection, and at the conclusion of jury 
selection he asks each potential juror to take the following pledge against bias: “I 
pledge I will not decide this case based on biases. This includes gut feelings, 
prejudices, stereotypes, personal likes or dislikes, sympathies or generalizations.” 
Kang, supra, at 1182. Judge Bennett also gives a jury instruction before opening 
statements that specifically addresses implicit biases:  
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Do not decide the case based on “implicit biases.” As we discussed in 
jury selection, everyone, including me, has feelings, assumptions, 
perceptions, fears, and stereotypes, that is, “implicit biases,” that we 
may not be aware of. These hidden thoughts can impact what we see 
and hear, how we remember what we see and hear, and how we make 
important decisions. Because you are making very important 
decisions in this case, I strongly encourage you to evaluate the 
evidence carefully and to resist jumping to conclusions based on 
personal likes or dislikes, generalizations, gut feelings, prejudices, 
sympathies, stereotypes, or biases. The law demands that you return a 
just verdict, based solely on the evidence, your individual evaluation 
of that evidence, your reason and common sense, and these 
instructions. Our system of justice is counting on you to render a fair 
decision based on the evidence, not on biases.  
 
Id. at 1182-83. A jury instruction such as this emphasizes the “universality 
of implicit biases [and] decreases the likelihood of insult, resentment or 
backlash from the jurors.” Id. at 1183. 
Additionally, “judges should recommend that jurors feel free to expressly 
raise and foreground any such biases in their discussions.” Id. at 1184. Thus, 
instead of repressing biases as irrelevant to understanding a case, “judges should 
make jurors comfortable with the legitimacy of raising such issues” and encourage 
jurors to be aware of and monitor their biases. Id. This perspective shifting may 
produce a more robust deliberation, which, evidence suggests, “can potentially 
decrease the amount of biased decision making.” Id. at 1184-85. 
A jury instruction such as the one used by Judge Bennett accomplishes two 
important goals: first, it puts jurors on notice that implicit biases exist and engages 
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them in an effective and meaningful discussion; second, it allows jurors to focus on 
the merits of the case.  
III. DEFENSE COUNSEL’S INAPPROPRIATE REFERENCE TO MR. 
AND MRS. EVANSES’ WHITENESS CREATED A RACIAL FRAME 
THAT MAY HAVE IMPROPERLY AFFECTED THE OUTCOME. 
Race was not relevant to the merits of the Plaintiffs’ case, but race was 
present in the courtroom. All the jurors were white, Intervenors-Plaintiffs Op. Br. 
at 26, as were the owners of the defendant corporation. Id. at 3. In contrast, all the 
individual Plaintiffs were Latina (and most of the Plaintiffs’ lawyers were women 
of color). Id. at 3-4. 
Defense counsel’s reference to the owners of Evans Fruit11 as “rich white 
people” subtly and improperly emphasized the shared common characteristics 
between the white jurors and the white owners of Evans Fruit. If intentional, 
defense counsel’s invocation of race is certainly more subtle than what occurred 
over 80 years ago when counsel in a civil case told the jury that the “Japanese 
people don’t like us, and we don’t like them,” Schotis, 1 P.2d at 225; but subtle 
appeals to solidarity are just as problematic. Guerrero, 800 S.W.2d at 865.  
Even if the reference was unintentional, there is still a danger that it unfairly 
affected the jury’s decision-making process, as social science teaches us that racial 
                                           
11
 As merits counsel discusses, defense counsel improperly and repeatedly stated 
the Plaintiffs were suing Mr. and Mrs. Evans individually, when in fact all claims 
were against Evans Fruit, Inc. Intervenors-Plaintiffs Op. Br. at 3-4, 57-58. 
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references can operate as a priming mechanism and activate implicit biases, 
including in-group favoritism. Part II.C., supra. As the juror studies discussed in 
Part II.D., supra, indicate, jurors treated defendants from racial out-groups less 
favorably than they did defendants from racial in-groups. See Sommers & 
Ellsworth, supra, at 1376 (where race was not salient but race was used as a 
priming mechanism, white jurors exhibited in-group favoritism); Mitchell et al., 
supra, at 627 (meta-analysis reviewing thirty-four juror verdict studies found in-
group bias at verdict and sentencing). 
Whether intentional or unintentional, counsel’s reference to the Evanses as 
“rich white people” had the potential to awaken certain biases in favor of the 
Evanses, distracting the jury from the merits of case. Further, the trial court 
overruled Plaintiffs’ objection to the “rich white people” comment. Nor did the 
court instruct defense counsel to refrain from using racial language and failed to 
discuss the dangers of implicit bias with the jurors. The court’s failure to address 
this improper invocation of race left the jury with the tacit message that the racial 
reference was acceptable. 
Defense counsel’s invocation of race, and, in particular, counsel’s emphasis 
on the Evanses’ whiteness in front of an all-white jury, calls into question the 
integrity of the verdict. Irrelevant and inflammatory racial comments that offend 
fundamental fairness and deprive litigants of due process rights cut against all 
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notions of fairness and justice in our legal system. A racial or ethnic plea, however 
subtle, should not be countenanced. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we ask that the Court grant the Appellants’ 
request for a new trial. 
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